The Afghan Presidential Election: Priceless!!

I am very upset!! There, I said it!!  Karzai, caught with his hand it the ballot box tampering with the choice of the people not only gets away with it but on top of that gets congratulated on his decision to accept a run off between Dr. Abdalah Abdalah and him.   Yes, a possible clash between Karzai on one hand and the US and its allies on the other is hardly desirable.  Yes, such a clash could, or better said would, lead to an extended political battle and subsequently a power vacuum in Kabul but isn’t this a slap in the face of democracy?  Are we to understand that building democracy suggests the acceptance of a watered down version of principles that in effect rewards those that manipulate the will of the people for their own benefit?  Are we to understand that the standards that we expect to see upheld in any Western Democracy do not apply to non-western nations or nations that are under construction as is the case with Afghanistan?   It appears that Afghanistan is a special case.. we can look the other way.  The cost of accepting failure in nurturing a political system that we perceive as the prerequisite for stability in the region and a deterrent to the extreme fanaticism of the Taliban is very high and very difficult to explain to Western voters.  It seems that the only thing the west succeeded in doing was to perpetuate a lie: a political leader in Kabul, Karzai to be exact, that shared our image of the region, our respect for democracy and a people supporting a political process that to us is second nature.  It might be time for the west to give up and accept that democracy is not for all and that in some cases, Afghanistan could well be a case in point, a political system closer to the indigenous political structure should be allowed to develop.  If, on the other hand, we insist on continuing our crusade then, we should have the strength of conviction to do the job right.  Elections plagued with fraud and corruption do not constitute a basis for legitimate governance.  We would never accept something like this in our own political process.  Why should we accept it in a country we are trying to build in our image?

It is in this light that I have serious misgiving with the decision to a second round run off between Karzai and Adbullah.  A weak government called to fight for secularism and democracy is a recipe for disaster, especially, in a region of the world where, for most people, both concepts are as foreign as taking cream with their coffee. It has been my belief that democracy rests on two pillars: the universal participation of the electorate and the respect of those running both for the rules governing the process and the final outcome.  The Afghan elections did not rest on either.  Neither the government nor the international community was able to create the conditions necessary to permit the Afghan citizens to cast their votes.  Based on the final certified results, at best, only 33% of the electorate was able to do so.  As for respect for the rules of the process, the vast electoral fraud uncovered by the investigation of the Electoral Complaints Commission has done irreversible harm to the process and, in addition, to Karzai’s legitimacy as a democratic ruler. The EU deputy chief observer, Dimitra Ioannou, alleged that of the 5.5 million ballots casted, 1.5 million (a staggering 27%) were suspected of being fraudulent.  Of these, 1.1 million had been casted for Karzai.   As such, our support for his participation in the run off election against Dr. Abdullah is short sighted. If there are consequences to our actions as we so often claim, Karzai should be automatically disqualified from the elections.  Either Abdullah should be declared the winner or, if that is considered too risky since he is also guilty to electoral fraud alas to a smaller scale, new elections should be called.  However, there is a larger question to be considered: why did we ignore the signs allowing such fraud en masse by our ally, Karzai?  Evidence of trouble brewing was present from the early stages of the process.

On paper, within reason keeping in mind the terrain and security concerns, Afghan elections should have run smoothly.  The monitoring, administration and legitimacy of the process were placed in the hands of two bodies: the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). However, in practice, the monitoring, administration and legitimacy of the process were placed in the purview of two bodies plagued with conflict of interest and open to criticism.  The Independent Election Commission (IEC), a body established by the Constitution, is responsible for the administration and supervision of all Afghan elections as well as responsible for certifying the election results.  It is comprised of nine members all of which are appointed by presidential decree thus, Karzai appointees and hence Karzai supporters. The second body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), is an independent Afghan body established under Article 52 of the 2005 Electoral Law to adjudicate all challenges and complaints related to the electoral process. It can hear complaints related to violations of the election law as defined in Article 53, and it has the authority to impose sanctions, as identified in Article 54, if an offense has been deemed to have been committed. In addition, the ECC can consider challenges to the eligibility of nominated candidates. According to the Electoral Law, the ECC is composed of two national Commissioners and three international Commissioners. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission appoints one Commissioner, one Commissioner is appointed by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the three internationals. It is not hard to see how a contested electoral process as is the case in hand could easily lead to major problems. 

The presidential election of August 20th was the second held following the removal of the Taliban regime.  Overall, the election was characterized by controversy from selecting the date on which  the election should be held to questions over candidate eligibility, lack of security, low voter turnout especially in areas controlled by the Taliban, widespread electoral fraud and intimidation.  Let us look at some of these issues analytically.

Although, under the 2004 Constitution, elections should have been held no later than 60 days prior to the end of President Karzai’s term (May 22^nd 2009), logistical concerns (fears about accessibility to areas and the ability to get adequate people and materials to places by the deadline) led the Independent Election Commission to delay the election until August 20^th.  There was not shortage of candidates.  By May 2009, 44 candidates had registered to participate in the election.  To mention a few, in addition to Karzai, the list included: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah the former Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance from 1998 onwards and the interim government installed after the US invasion; Dr. Ramazan Bashardost who served as the Planning Minister, was critical of corruption and resigned under government and foreign pressure; Dr. Ashraf Ghani a Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C and former Finance Minister; Mirwais Yasini the First Deputy Speaker of the Afghan House of the People  (the elected Chamber of the Afghan Parliament); Shahla Atta a liberal female MP; Zabihullah Ghazi Nuristani leader of the Justice and Development Party of Afghanistan; Adbuk Jabbar Sabit former Attorney General; ShahNawaz Tanai former Defense Minister; and Uzbek leader Akbar Bai.  Despite the prominent candidates the list also included a number of candidates with dubious human rights records and drug trafficking associations.  According to Human rights groups about 70 candidates associated with illegal armed groups were included on the ballot list despite electoral law prohibiting such candidates.  Although the Independent Election Commission rejected 56 candidacies on the grounds of association with illegal armed groups, many of the stronger warlords were able to bypass regulations by registering their illegal militia as private security companies.   It is worth noting that both Vice-Presidential Candidates on Karzai’s ticket, not to mention a number of his close allies, are alleged to have committed widespread human rights violations and war crimes.   The Human Rights Watch has called for the prosecution of Vice-President Karim Khalil, former Army Chief Abdul Rashid Dostum and former Senior Security Advisor Mohammad Qasim Fahim for war crimes.  The latter along with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President’s half brother and the head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, has also been alleged to have strong drug trafficking ties.   Ahmed Wali Karzai is believed to be controlling a significant portion of the Afghan heroin production.    Of the long list of candidates at the end three names became the focus of the race: Karzai, Abbullah Abdullah and Bashardost.

The challenges facing all candidates were great: the insurgency and luck of security, civilian casualties, corruption, and poverty to mention a few.  According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AHIRC) security concerns prevented presidential candidates from campaigning in most of the provinces and candidates running for provincial councils were under constant threat.  As for female candidates, widespread cultural opposition to women in public made campaigning from women very difficult, if not impossible, in many parts of the country.   Despite the surge of additional troops into Afghanistan in the months leading to the elections as well as the operations held against Taliban strongholds in the days before the election, 12 out of the 34 Afghan provinces remained classified by the Ministry of Interior as “high risk” in essence, areas with limited or no governmental presence.  To enhance security the Afghan government contracted the services of roughly 10,000 tribesmen responsible for securing polling stations in 21 of the 34 provinces and Karzai order the halt of operations to allow the country’s security forces to help with security on Election Day.  Even despite these measures, a day before the election a large number of polling stations closed across the country for fear of inability of the security forces to provide protection to the election monitors assigned to these areas.    These measures did not deter the insurgents from attempting to disrupt the elections.  Days before the elections Kabul witnessed a series of attacks targeting, amongst others, the NATO’s headquarters and the Presidential Palace.  Two days prior to the election, an International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) spokesperson stated that attacks had spiked from an average of 32 per day to an average of 48 per day.  Afghan government officials reported that the day of the elections 73 incidents of violence had taken place in 15 provinces however, the number could not be independently verified because of the government imposed bane on reporting violence on the day of the elections out of fear that such reports might inhibit voters from going to the polls.  ISAF on the other hand reported that more than 400 militant attacks occurred on Election Day. 

As if security was not enough of a challenge, as early as December 2008, an equally dangerous and potentially more harmful challenge was identified: widespread instances of fraud in the voter registration process. Reports from a number of sources indicated that in many places voters were issued multiple cards and in many cases cards were issued for children as well as imaginary female relatives.  According to a pre-election report by the Afghanistan Analyst Network, a Kabul based group of foreign experts, as many as 3 million voters on the register rolls were feared to be imaginary thus questioning the integrity of the electoral result.  Two days prior to the elections, the BBC, acting on information of voting cards sales in Kabul reported on electoral fraud and corruption in the elections.  A journalist working under cover posing as a potential buyer was offered 1000 voting cards on the spot for $10.00 per card.  The samples provided were all authentic with the names, photos and home details of the voter on them. In the process of the story investigation the BBC was offered thousands of voting cards.  The report even revealed a flourishing black market in voter registration cards across the nation.  Further vote tampering came in the form of bribery, voter coercion and voter intimidation.  Reports surfaced indicating that people working for the candidates deliberately tried to influence the outcome of the vote by securing large blocks of votes through bribery.  Keeping in mind the hierarchical nature of Afghan society, local leaders have the ability to sway followers to vote for one candidate or the other thus making them prime candidates for bribery.  Along with bribery coercion and intimidation were also reported. 

Election day news was dominated by reports of irregularities and fraud.  Shortly after the opening of the polling stations the US Embassy in Kabul received numerous fraud complaints from ballot stuffing to repeat voting to improper interference in the process by the local staff of the Independent Election Commission and in some cases candidate representatives as well.   As the day progressed it was becoming more apparent that the process will be flawed but western representatives were hopeful that the inevitable corruption and fraud would be minimized to an acceptable level where it would not alter the final result. By August 25^th, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) reported receiving 1,157 complaints of which 54 where categorized as “high priority” and material to the outcome of the elections.  As partial results were announced on August 31^st (47.8% of polling stations) showing Karzai leading with 45.9% with Abdullah second (33.3%) and Bashardost third (12.5%) massive fraud was alleged and controversy brewed.  By September senior Western diplomats claimed that hundreds of thousand of ballots for Karzai were from as many as 800 fake polling stations.  The same sources claimed that Karzai supporters also took control of about the same amount of actual polling stations and used them to fraudulently report thousand of ballots in favor of Karzai. For example in Kandahar preliminary results indicated that some 350,000 ballots had been casted but Western officials estimated that only 25,000 voters went to the polls.  By September 8^th, the Electoral Complaints Commission reported that 720 major fraud allegations considered material to the outcome of the elections had been registered and ordered recounts at polling stations where it had found evidence of clear and convincing evidence of fraud in at least 3 provinces.  Interesting enough, on the same day, the Independent Election Commission released partial results (91.6% of polling stations) that for the first time showed Karzai leading with 54.1% thus meeting the crucial 50% requirement to be declared the winner.  Abdullah was reported second with 28.3% of the vote while Bashardost was reported third with 9.2% of the vote.  Ghani was a distant fourth with 2.7% of the vote.  On September 10^th the Electoral Complaints Commission ordered the invalidation of ten of thousand of Karzai votes from 83 polling stations from 3 provinces and on the 15^th ordered a recount in 2,600 or 10% of the total polling stations most of them situated in Southern Afghanistan, a Karzai stronghold. The scope of the recount was such that we should not be surprised of the agreement between the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaint Commission to rely on statistical sampling to address the complaints.  The agreement, aimed at expediting the process instead of carrying out an in-depth investigation of all alleged voting irregularities, resulted in the recount of ballots from 313 polling stations out of the 3,063 polling stations that had been deemed suspicious.  It should be noted that the EU deputy chief observer, Dimitra Ioannou, alleged that of the 5.5 million ballots casted, 1.5 million (a staggering 27%) were suspected of being fraudulent.  Of these, 1.1 million had been casted for Karzai.  An interesting side note: if the assertion were correct, voter turnout would drop from an estimated 30-35% to approximately 27%.  How is it possible to consider legitimate the winner of such elections? 

That question aside, on October 20^th, under heavy pressure, Karzai agreed to a second round election between Dr. Adbullah and him.  According to certified final result released on the same day, Karzai received 2,283,907 votes and 49.67% of the vote, Abdullah received 1,406, 220 votes and 30.59% of the vote, Bashardost received 481,072 votes and 10.46% of the vote and Ghani received 135,106 votes and 2.94% of the vote. While UN and American officials hailed the elections as a success, evidence from the ground suggested that the Taliban were successful in their efforts to deter many Afghans from voting.  Although at the end of Election Day top election officials estimated voter turnout across the country to be between 40-50%, figures released by the Independent Election Commission on August 31^st with ballots from half of the nations polling stations counted indicated that the voter turnout was between 30-35%.  By October 20^th this figure was even lower: voter turnout was estimated to have been between 30% and 33% of the electorate.

When the decision was made to invade Afghanistan the rhetoric surrounding the decision was heavily coated by the importance of removing the Taliban from power, apprehend Osama Bin Laden and established a democratic state so as to assure that Afghanistan will no longer be part of the axis of terror that plagued our world.  Eight years into our intervention none of these have been achieved and if anything by today’s actions we might cause irreversible harm to all of them. Although I understand and support the need for a stable government in Afghanistan I seriously challenge the notion that such a government can be the result of a ballot where the leading candidate and incumbent has been caught violating the rules that he should be the first to uphold.

Whether Abdullah should be declared the winner or a new election (excluding Karzai) should be called, the decision is not easy and will prove controversial.  According to current rules the Electoral Complaint Commission is the body responsible for adjudicating any challenges to the process and imposing sanctions when deemed necessary.  A decision to disqualify Karzai, short of being unanimous, will be certainly deemed international manipulation and can easily play into the Taliban rhetoric.  On the other hand trying to get the support of the International Election Committee might prove equally difficult keeping in mind that the members of that body are appointed by Presidential decree and can be assumed to be strong Karzai supporters.  Be that as it may, a second round with Karzai’s participation is a mockery of the democratic process.  If we are to support that we might as well declare Karzai the winner and save money, time, aggravation and lives.  Look at the silver lining… this will be his last term.  That is, if he upholds the oath of office, the Afghan Constitution and the west decides to challenge him in the event that he does not.  After all, we do have a rich record of looking the other way when actions are deemed supportive of our foreign policy aims even when that comes at a high cost.

And the Noble Peace Prize goes to: A Dream... a non nuclear world!

 When on October 9^th the Noble Peace Prize recipient for 2009 was announced many, including myself, were surprised by the decision of the committee.   The Noble Peace Prize is one of five prizes awarded annually since 1901 under the auspices of the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm for outstanding contributions in the filed of physics, chemistry, medicine or philosophy, literature and peace.  The Peace Prize is awarded by a committee appointed by the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) in accordance to the guidelines laid down in Nobel's will.  According to the latter, the Prize is to be awarded to whoever "shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses."

According to the press release of the Committee, President Obama, was awarded the prize for "his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between people with special importance attached to his vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons. "  How much work President Obama had completed in this field over his short tenure to validate the choice of the committee will be a topic of discussion for a while.  However, one thing that the Committee's decision achieved was to thrust to the forefront nuclear disarmament and their support for any such efforts.

Yet, even with that support can a non-nuclear world become a reality?  For starters, is the US ready to forgo its nuclear arsenal?  After all if the state that introduced this weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not willing to eliminate it, how can we expect, let alone demand, that other nuclear states (UK, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea) do so?   So far the world has only witnessed the willingness of the US and Russia to reduce their arsenals, not eliminate them.  Complicating matters, there is no disarmament regime in place that addresses the arsenals of the remaining nuclear powers possessing projection capabilities.

Today, 41 years since the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty a non-nuclear world seems to be at best, a dream.  In some quarters it might even be a nightmare.  An article that appeared at TIME seems to support that view.  In his article Want Peace? Give a Nuke the Nobel author David Von Drehle supports the premise that nuclear weapons should be the recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for without them the modern world would have followed the distractive patterns present in international relation that led to both World Wars.  Because of that, he further states that the issue should never be a world without nuclear weapons but rather a world with a strengthened non-proliferation regime and a comprehensive effort to secure loose nukes.  In short the author supports that fewer nuclear weapons in fewer hands should be the path of the future.  However, therein lies the problem.  Which are these hands?

The number of Nuclear Weapons States has increased.  When the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treat was signed the club had four members: the US (1945), the USSR (1949) the UK (1952) and France (1960).   All but France signed the Treaty.  1964 witnessed a new addition to the list, China.  The 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty internationally recognized these five states as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) but as of it's entering into force in 1970 three more states confirmed possession of nuclear weapons: India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006).  It should be noted that two of these states, namely India and Pakistan, were not party to the treaty whereas the third, North Korea, signed the treaty but withdrew in 2003.  The club should include at least two more entries: South Africa and Israel.  The former is the only state that holds the dubious record of developing nuclear weapons (1980s) only to destroy them before becoming a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1991).  Israel on the other hand, assumed to have had possession of the weapon since 1979, has neither confirmed nor denied it and is not a party to the treaty.  Although not all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) possess the same capabilities whether be it the number of weapons in their arsenal or their capacity to project nuclear power beyond their immediate region, it is certain that the current nuclear club has a very different dynamic from the past.  With additional states able to claim membership if they so desire (Brazil) or perceive it as a sovereignty prerogative (Iran), it might be challenging to define what criteria should be used to determine which states should be recognized as NWS or excluded from the club.

Be that as it may, how do we accommodate the new reality?  In the age of globalization a fresh approach to non-proliferation is imperative.  The stagnant regime established by the NPT of 1968 needs to be re-addressed for, not only have we seen changes in the number of NSW but, we have also seen changes in the relative power of the original five. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 that came into force in 1970 governs nuclear proliferation. Overall, although not explicitly present in it’s wording, the NTP can be viewed as being comprised of three pillars: Non-Proliferation, Disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The articles contained within the first pillar of the treaty establish the framework of the regime governing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their use.  In short the pillar calls both the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to preserve the 1968 status quo by asking the five nuclear powers (US, UK, France, China and the then USSR) to refrain from transferring, encouraging or supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states while asking the non-nuclear states, that is the rest of the world, not to develop or manufacture such weapons either alone or by the assistance of others.  Since the treaty did not prohibit the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful use (as reflected in the third pillar of the treaty), the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at verifying that no nuclear power is diverted from peaceful use to the development of weapons.  The second pillar, disarmament, can be seen as an attempt to do damage control. It contains language that vaguely obliges the signatories to move towards nuclear, as well as, total disarmament.  Article VI states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament."  However, it seems that the article places more emphasis on the responsibility of the signatories to engage in negotiations aiming at disarmament rather than disarmament itself.  The last pillar, peaceful use of nuclear technology, allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to signatory states for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. 

Has the NPT failed us?  If the objective of the treaty was to limit the number of NWS to the five it recognized, bring about total nuclear disarmament and allow the peaceful use of nuclear technology, then, it has failed in two out of its three objectives.  Technically, the states that ended up developing nuclear capabilities were not part to the treaty and thus, according to international law, not bound by it.  The same holds true for North Korea.  Although North Korea had signed the treaty it should be remembered that it withdrew in 2003 and did not become a nuclear weapons state until 2006. However, depending on one’s interpretation of the treaty, one can identify other violations that undermined the NPT’s success. A good example is the implementation of NATO’s nuclear weapons sharing program.  The program allowed the deployment and storage of US nuclear weapons by NATO non-nuclear members.  Although the nuclear weapons shared through the program and stationed on the soil of member states remained the possession of the US, the personnel training necessary for the safe handling of the weapons and the adaptations made by non-US forces (both naval and air) to enable use/delivery of the weapons could assume transfer of nuclear technical information thus violating Article I of the treaty.  At the same time, by virtue of permitting the stationing of such weapons on their soil, the non-nuclear recipients are violating Article II of the treaty.  Furthermore, a strict interpretation of the treaty would find all five nuclear weapon states in violation of it since they did not manage to achieve nuclear disarmament.  However, one could argue, that although total conventional and nuclear disarmament is far from being a reality, since states have made efforts to reduce their arsenals within international arms control agreements the letter of the treaty was upheld. As for nuclear disarmament, despite the absence of a comprehensive treaty binding on all nuclear powers party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it could be argues that the treaty was instrumental in permitting negotiations between the US and the USSR at the height of the cold war.  Last but not least, the ability of the signatories of the treaty to share nuclear technologies for civilian projects became the Achilles heal of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although only a handful of states diverted nuclear power from peaceful projects to the production of weapons, the proliferation of nuclear power for peaceful use permitted the proliferation of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities.  In effect, such capabilities are tantamount to a virtual nuclear weapons program for they allow the on demand production of fissile materials necessary for nuclear weapons. 

Based on the above we cannot regard the NTP as a complete failure.  If anything it seems that the NPT as any other treaty has its limitations.  Whether intentional or not it did create a divide between those that possessed nuclear weapons, those that did not and those that did not but would like to.  The states that did not sign the NPT claim to have done so because of this divide and the question it raises: on what grounds is such a divide valid?  Even worse, the NTP was not empowered with a credible enforcement regime that would address treaty violations and take action without holding non-proliferation hostage to the political interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.  The International Atomic Energy Agency responsible for monitoring compliance to the NPT reports violations that threaten international security to the UN Security Council for action. 

With technological advances an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states should be expected.  If nothing else, it should be taken for granted that a significant number of states using nuclear power have the technical knowledge to develop nuclear weapons but choose not to do so.  According to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the number of states capable of developing nuclear weapons rests between 35 and 40.

The bipolar world that served as the backdrop to the formulation of the NPT of 1968 has seized to exist. A revised NPT needs to assume a multipolar world for many of the new NWS are, or aspire to become, regional powers.  The new treaty should retain the three-pillar structure of its 1968 predecessor however, with a major change.  The first pillar should become that of nuclear proliferation.  First and foremost, the new regime needs to establish the conditions that will entice the current non-signatories to the NPT to join. By eliminating the divide between those that have nuclear weapons and those that have not, the new treaty will eliminate the argument presented by those nuclear weapons states that refuse to become party to it.   This should be followed by a reversal of policy:  rather that focus on no-proliferation a policy that will reinstate the divide but with a larger membership on the side of those states that possess the weapons than in the original treaty of 1968, the new treaty should allow proliferation.  The clock cannot be set back to 1968.  The new reality needs to be recognized and forward thinking mechanisms need to be put in place to govern the proliferation of nuclear power.  The hope that the current non-signatories to the NPT will be willing to destroy their respective arsenals is ludicrous. This hope can only become reality if the major five abandon their arsenals as well.  That, undoubtedly, is utopian.  If the major nuclear states are unwilling to destroy their nuclear arsenals we should not expect the smaller ones to be willing to do so.  If states are not willing to destroy their arsenals we should not expect others not to be interested in developing them especially if they perceive possession of them as a security guarantee against regional conflict.   The tactics of sanctions (as has been the case with Iran, North Korea and even Libya) or preemptive military action against a sovereign state’s nuclear facilities (as Israel did against Iraq and the US against Libya) are neither effective nor acceptable.   Once all nuclear weapon states are party to the new regime it will be imperative to launch comprehensive nuclear disarmament talks. If we are to reach a point where a non-nuclear world is to become a reality, bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament limited to the US and Russia is not enough.  It is important to make sure that all NWS have a vested interest and are part of the process.  The disparity of capabilities will pause a challenge but since any disarmament agreement will most likely be gradual allowances can be made to balance the process.  A new element needs to be considered.  With the new treaty allowing proliferation it is important that a system be put in place that safeguards the disarmament process.  Here a lesson from the European Union might be appropriate.  The disarmament regime negotiated by the NWS should be treated as Acquis Communautaire – it applied to all states part of the treaty irrespective of their status at the time of its adoption.  Thus, should a non-nuclear state at the time of ratification decide to develop nuclear weapons, that state will be bound by any disarmament agreements in force.   The last piece of the puzzle, the third pillar of the 1968 NPT should remain in place as is.  The International Atomic Energy Agency should remain the main international body governing the proliferation of nuclear power for civilian projects. With policing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons no longer on its agenda, the Agency will have the opportunity to play a stronger role in introducing nuclear energy as an alternative fuel source and enhancing the secure operation of the nuclear reactors currently in service. 

History shows us that the vigorous defense of the status quo by any group of states usually ends in conflict for it is inevitable that the group feeling left out will make it their priority to overturn the status quo as soon as they become strong enough to do so.  Nuclear proliferation cannot be placed neatly into a box.  Although changing the regime governing it though conflict is not an option, assured mutual distraction is certainly not an appealing option, the present status quo is destabilizing world security.   The time has come to change that.