I am very upset!! There, I said it!! Karzai, caught with his hand it the ballot box tampering with the choice of the people not only gets away with it but on top of that gets congratulated on his decision to accept a run off between Dr. Abdalah Abdalah and him. Yes, a possible clash between Karzai on one hand and the US and its allies on the other is hardly desirable. Yes, such a clash could, or better said would, lead to an extended political battle and subsequently a power vacuum in Kabul but isn’t this a slap in the face of democracy? Are we to understand that building democracy suggests the acceptance of a watered down version of principles that in effect rewards those that manipulate the will of the people for their own benefit? Are we to understand that the standards that we expect to see upheld in any Western Democracy do not apply to non-western nations or nations that are under construction as is the case with Afghanistan? It appears that Afghanistan is a special case.. we can look the other way. The cost of accepting failure in nurturing a political system that we perceive as the prerequisite for stability in the region and a deterrent to the extreme fanaticism of the Taliban is very high and very difficult to explain to Western voters. It seems that the only thing the west succeeded in doing was to perpetuate a lie: a political leader in Kabul, Karzai to be exact, that shared our image of the region, our respect for democracy and a people supporting a political process that to us is second nature. It might be time for the west to give up and accept that democracy is not for all and that in some cases, Afghanistan could well be a case in point, a political system closer to the indigenous political structure should be allowed to develop. If, on the other hand, we insist on continuing our crusade then, we should have the strength of conviction to do the job right. Elections plagued with fraud and corruption do not constitute a basis for legitimate governance. We would never accept something like this in our own political process. Why should we accept it in a country we are trying to build in our image?
It is in this light that I have serious misgiving with the decision to a second round run off between Karzai and Adbullah. A weak government called to fight for secularism and democracy is a recipe for disaster, especially, in a region of the world where, for most people, both concepts are as foreign as taking cream with their coffee. It has been my belief that democracy rests on two pillars: the universal participation of the electorate and the respect of those running both for the rules governing the process and the final outcome. The Afghan elections did not rest on either. Neither the government nor the international community was able to create the conditions necessary to permit the Afghan citizens to cast their votes. Based on the final certified results, at best, only 33% of the electorate was able to do so. As for respect for the rules of the process, the vast electoral fraud uncovered by the investigation of the Electoral Complaints Commission has done irreversible harm to the process and, in addition, to Karzai’s legitimacy as a democratic ruler. The EU deputy chief observer, Dimitra Ioannou, alleged that of the 5.5 million ballots casted, 1.5 million (a staggering 27%) were suspected of being fraudulent. Of these, 1.1 million had been casted for Karzai. As such, our support for his participation in the run off election against Dr. Abdullah is short sighted. If there are consequences to our actions as we so often claim, Karzai should be automatically disqualified from the elections. Either Abdullah should be declared the winner or, if that is considered too risky since he is also guilty to electoral fraud alas to a smaller scale, new elections should be called. However, there is a larger question to be considered: why did we ignore the signs allowing such fraud en masse by our ally, Karzai? Evidence of trouble brewing was present from the early stages of the process.
On paper, within reason keeping in mind the terrain and security concerns, Afghan elections should have run smoothly. The monitoring, administration and legitimacy of the process were placed in the hands of two bodies: the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). However, in practice, the monitoring, administration and legitimacy of the process were placed in the purview of two bodies plagued with conflict of interest and open to criticism. The Independent Election Commission (IEC), a body established by the Constitution, is responsible for the administration and supervision of all Afghan elections as well as responsible for certifying the election results. It is comprised of nine members all of which are appointed by presidential decree thus, Karzai appointees and hence Karzai supporters. The second body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), is an independent Afghan body established under Article 52 of the 2005 Electoral Law to adjudicate all challenges and complaints related to the electoral process. It can hear complaints related to violations of the election law as defined in Article 53, and it has the authority to impose sanctions, as identified in Article 54, if an offense has been deemed to have been committed. In addition, the ECC can consider challenges to the eligibility of nominated candidates. According to the Electoral Law, the ECC is composed of two national Commissioners and three international Commissioners. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission appoints one Commissioner, one Commissioner is appointed by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the three internationals. It is not hard to see how a contested electoral process as is the case in hand could easily lead to major problems.
The presidential election of August 20th was the second held following the removal of the Taliban regime. Overall, the election was characterized by controversy from selecting the date on which the election should be held to questions over candidate eligibility, lack of security, low voter turnout especially in areas controlled by the Taliban, widespread electoral fraud and intimidation. Let us look at some of these issues analytically.
Although, under the 2004 Constitution, elections should have been held no later than 60 days prior to the end of President Karzai’s term (May 22nd 2009), logistical concerns (fears about accessibility to areas and the ability to get adequate people and materials to places by the deadline) led the Independent Election Commission to delay the election until August 20th. There was not shortage of candidates. By May 2009, 44 candidates had registered to participate in the election. To mention a few, in addition to Karzai, the list included: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah the former Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance from 1998 onwards and the interim government installed after the US invasion; Dr. Ramazan Bashardost who served as the Planning Minister, was critical of corruption and resigned under government and foreign pressure; Dr. Ashraf Ghani a Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C and former Finance Minister; Mirwais Yasini the First Deputy Speaker of the Afghan House of the People (the elected Chamber of the Afghan Parliament); Shahla Atta a liberal female MP; Zabihullah Ghazi Nuristani leader of the Justice and Development Party of Afghanistan; Adbuk Jabbar Sabit former Attorney General; ShahNawaz Tanai former Defense Minister; and Uzbek leader Akbar Bai. Despite the prominent candidates the list also included a number of candidates with dubious human rights records and drug trafficking associations. According to Human rights groups about 70 candidates associated with illegal armed groups were included on the ballot list despite electoral law prohibiting such candidates. Although the Independent Election Commission rejected 56 candidacies on the grounds of association with illegal armed groups, many of the stronger warlords were able to bypass regulations by registering their illegal militia as private security companies. It is worth noting that both Vice-Presidential Candidates on Karzai’s ticket, not to mention a number of his close allies, are alleged to have committed widespread human rights violations and war crimes. The Human Rights Watch has called for the prosecution of Vice-President Karim Khalil, former Army Chief Abdul Rashid Dostum and former Senior Security Advisor Mohammad Qasim Fahim for war crimes. The latter along with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President’s half brother and the head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, has also been alleged to have strong drug trafficking ties. Ahmed Wali Karzai is believed to be controlling a significant portion of the Afghan heroin production. Of the long list of candidates at the end three names became the focus of the race: Karzai, Abbullah Abdullah and Bashardost.
The challenges facing all candidates were great: the insurgency and luck of security, civilian casualties, corruption, and poverty to mention a few. According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AHIRC) security concerns prevented presidential candidates from campaigning in most of the provinces and candidates running for provincial councils were under constant threat. As for female candidates, widespread cultural opposition to women in public made campaigning from women very difficult, if not impossible, in many parts of the country. Despite the surge of additional troops into Afghanistan in the months leading to the elections as well as the operations held against Taliban strongholds in the days before the election, 12 out of the 34 Afghan provinces remained classified by the Ministry of Interior as “high risk” in essence, areas with limited or no governmental presence. To enhance security the Afghan government contracted the services of roughly 10,000 tribesmen responsible for securing polling stations in 21 of the 34 provinces and Karzai order the halt of operations to allow the country’s security forces to help with security on Election Day. Even despite these measures, a day before the election a large number of polling stations closed across the country for fear of inability of the security forces to provide protection to the election monitors assigned to these areas. These measures did not deter the insurgents from attempting to disrupt the elections. Days before the elections Kabul witnessed a series of attacks targeting, amongst others, the NATO’s headquarters and the Presidential Palace. Two days prior to the election, an International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) spokesperson stated that attacks had spiked from an average of 32 per day to an average of 48 per day. Afghan government officials reported that the day of the elections 73 incidents of violence had taken place in 15 provinces however, the number could not be independently verified because of the government imposed bane on reporting violence on the day of the elections out of fear that such reports might inhibit voters from going to the polls. ISAF on the other hand reported that more than 400 militant attacks occurred on Election Day.
As if security was not enough of a challenge, as early as December 2008, an equally dangerous and potentially more harmful challenge was identified: widespread instances of fraud in the voter registration process. Reports from a number of sources indicated that in many places voters were issued multiple cards and in many cases cards were issued for children as well as imaginary female relatives. According to a pre-election report by the Afghanistan Analyst Network, a Kabul based group of foreign experts, as many as 3 million voters on the register rolls were feared to be imaginary thus questioning the integrity of the electoral result. Two days prior to the elections, the BBC, acting on information of voting cards sales in Kabul reported on electoral fraud and corruption in the elections. A journalist working under cover posing as a potential buyer was offered 1000 voting cards on the spot for $10.00 per card. The samples provided were all authentic with the names, photos and home details of the voter on them. In the process of the story investigation the BBC was offered thousands of voting cards. The report even revealed a flourishing black market in voter registration cards across the nation. Further vote tampering came in the form of bribery, voter coercion and voter intimidation. Reports surfaced indicating that people working for the candidates deliberately tried to influence the outcome of the vote by securing large blocks of votes through bribery. Keeping in mind the hierarchical nature of Afghan society, local leaders have the ability to sway followers to vote for one candidate or the other thus making them prime candidates for bribery. Along with bribery coercion and intimidation were also reported.
Election day news was dominated by reports of irregularities and fraud. Shortly after the opening of the polling stations the US Embassy in Kabul received numerous fraud complaints from ballot stuffing to repeat voting to improper interference in the process by the local staff of the Independent Election Commission and in some cases candidate representatives as well. As the day progressed it was becoming more apparent that the process will be flawed but western representatives were hopeful that the inevitable corruption and fraud would be minimized to an acceptable level where it would not alter the final result. By August 25th, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) reported receiving 1,157 complaints of which 54 where categorized as “high priority” and material to the outcome of the elections. As partial results were announced on August 31st (47.8% of polling stations) showing Karzai leading with 45.9% with Abdullah second (33.3%) and Bashardost third (12.5%) massive fraud was alleged and controversy brewed. By September senior Western diplomats claimed that hundreds of thousand of ballots for Karzai were from as many as 800 fake polling stations. The same sources claimed that Karzai supporters also took control of about the same amount of actual polling stations and used them to fraudulently report thousand of ballots in favor of Karzai. For example in Kandahar preliminary results indicated that some 350,000 ballots had been casted but Western officials estimated that only 25,000 voters went to the polls. By September 8th, the Electoral Complaints Commission reported that 720 major fraud allegations considered material to the outcome of the elections had been registered and ordered recounts at polling stations where it had found evidence of clear and convincing evidence of fraud in at least 3 provinces. Interesting enough, on the same day, the Independent Election Commission released partial results (91.6% of polling stations) that for the first time showed Karzai leading with 54.1% thus meeting the crucial 50% requirement to be declared the winner. Abdullah was reported second with 28.3% of the vote while Bashardost was reported third with 9.2% of the vote. Ghani was a distant fourth with 2.7% of the vote. On September 10th the Electoral Complaints Commission ordered the invalidation of ten of thousand of Karzai votes from 83 polling stations from 3 provinces and on the 15th ordered a recount in 2,600 or 10% of the total polling stations most of them situated in Southern Afghanistan, a Karzai stronghold. The scope of the recount was such that we should not be surprised of the agreement between the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaint Commission to rely on statistical sampling to address the complaints. The agreement, aimed at expediting the process instead of carrying out an in-depth investigation of all alleged voting irregularities, resulted in the recount of ballots from 313 polling stations out of the 3,063 polling stations that had been deemed suspicious. It should be noted that the EU deputy chief observer, Dimitra Ioannou, alleged that of the 5.5 million ballots casted, 1.5 million (a staggering 27%) were suspected of being fraudulent. Of these, 1.1 million had been casted for Karzai. An interesting side note: if the assertion were correct, voter turnout would drop from an estimated 30-35% to approximately 27%. How is it possible to consider legitimate the winner of such elections?
That question aside, on October 20th, under heavy pressure, Karzai agreed to a second round election between Dr. Adbullah and him. According to certified final result released on the same day, Karzai received 2,283,907 votes and 49.67% of the vote, Abdullah received 1,406, 220 votes and 30.59% of the vote, Bashardost received 481,072 votes and 10.46% of the vote and Ghani received 135,106 votes and 2.94% of the vote. While UN and American officials hailed the elections as a success, evidence from the ground suggested that the Taliban were successful in their efforts to deter many Afghans from voting. Although at the end of Election Day top election officials estimated voter turnout across the country to be between 40-50%, figures released by the Independent Election Commission on August 31st with ballots from half of the nations polling stations counted indicated that the voter turnout was between 30-35%. By October 20th this figure was even lower: voter turnout was estimated to have been between 30% and 33% of the electorate.
When the decision was made to invade Afghanistan the rhetoric surrounding the decision was heavily coated by the importance of removing the Taliban from power, apprehend Osama Bin Laden and established a democratic state so as to assure that Afghanistan will no longer be part of the axis of terror that plagued our world. Eight years into our intervention none of these have been achieved and if anything by today’s actions we might cause irreversible harm to all of them. Although I understand and support the need for a stable government in Afghanistan I seriously challenge the notion that such a government can be the result of a ballot where the leading candidate and incumbent has been caught violating the rules that he should be the first to uphold.
Whether Abdullah should be declared the winner or a new election (excluding Karzai) should be called, the decision is not easy and will prove controversial. According to current rules the Electoral Complaint Commission is the body responsible for adjudicating any challenges to the process and imposing sanctions when deemed necessary. A decision to disqualify Karzai, short of being unanimous, will be certainly deemed international manipulation and can easily play into the Taliban rhetoric. On the other hand trying to get the support of the International Election Committee might prove equally difficult keeping in mind that the members of that body are appointed by Presidential decree and can be assumed to be strong Karzai supporters. Be that as it may, a second round with Karzai’s participation is a mockery of the democratic process. If we are to support that we might as well declare Karzai the winner and save money, time, aggravation and lives. Look at the silver lining… this will be his last term. That is, if he upholds the oath of office, the Afghan Constitution and the west decides to challenge him in the event that he does not. After all, we do have a rich record of looking the other way when actions are deemed supportive of our foreign policy aims even when that comes at a high cost.
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