When on October 9th the Noble Peace Prize recipient for 2009 was announced many, including myself, were surprised by the decision of the committee. The Noble Peace Prize is one of five prizes awarded annually since 1901 under the auspices of the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm for outstanding contributions in the filed of physics, chemistry, medicine or philosophy, literature and peace. The Peace Prize is awarded by a committee appointed by the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) in accordance to the guidelines laid down in Nobel's will. According to the latter, the Prize is to be awarded to whoever "shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses."
According to the press release of the Committee, President Obama, was awarded the prize for "his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between people with special importance attached to his vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons. " How much work President Obama had completed in this field over his short tenure to validate the choice of the committee will be a topic of discussion for a while. However, one thing that the Committee's decision achieved was to thrust to the forefront nuclear disarmament and their support for any such efforts.
Yet, even with that support can a non-nuclear world become a reality? For starters, is the US ready to forgo its nuclear arsenal? After all if the state that introduced this weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not willing to eliminate it, how can we expect, let alone demand, that other nuclear states (UK, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea) do so? So far the world has only witnessed the willingness of the US and Russia to reduce their arsenals, not eliminate them. Complicating matters, there is no disarmament regime in place that addresses the arsenals of the remaining nuclear powers possessing projection capabilities.
Today, 41 years since the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty a non-nuclear world seems to be at best, a dream. In some quarters it might even be a nightmare. An article that appeared at TIME seems to support that view. In his article Want Peace? Give a Nuke the Nobel author David Von Drehle supports the premise that nuclear weapons should be the recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for without them the modern world would have followed the distractive patterns present in international relation that led to both World Wars. Because of that, he further states that the issue should never be a world without nuclear weapons but rather a world with a strengthened non-proliferation regime and a comprehensive effort to secure loose nukes. In short the author supports that fewer nuclear weapons in fewer hands should be the path of the future. However, therein lies the problem. Which are these hands?
The number of Nuclear Weapons States has increased. When the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treat was signed the club had four members: the US (1945), the USSR (1949) the UK (1952) and France (1960). All but France signed the Treaty. 1964 witnessed a new addition to the list, China. The 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty internationally recognized these five states as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) but as of it's entering into force in 1970 three more states confirmed possession of nuclear weapons: India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). It should be noted that two of these states, namely India and Pakistan, were not party to the treaty whereas the third, North Korea, signed the treaty but withdrew in 2003. The club should include at least two more entries: South Africa and Israel. The former is the only state that holds the dubious record of developing nuclear weapons (1980s) only to destroy them before becoming a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1991). Israel on the other hand, assumed to have had possession of the weapon since 1979, has neither confirmed nor denied it and is not a party to the treaty. Although not all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) possess the same capabilities whether be it the number of weapons in their arsenal or their capacity to project nuclear power beyond their immediate region, it is certain that the current nuclear club has a very different dynamic from the past. With additional states able to claim membership if they so desire (Brazil) or perceive it as a sovereignty prerogative (Iran), it might be challenging to define what criteria should be used to determine which states should be recognized as NWS or excluded from the club.
Be that as it may, how do we accommodate the new reality? In the age of globalization a fresh approach to non-proliferation is imperative. The stagnant regime established by the NPT of 1968 needs to be re-addressed for, not only have we seen changes in the number of NSW but, we have also seen changes in the relative power of the original five.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 that came into force in 1970 governs nuclear proliferation. Overall, although not explicitly present in it’s wording, the NTP can be viewed as being comprised of three pillars: Non-Proliferation, Disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The articles contained within the first pillar of the treaty establish the framework of the regime governing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their use. In short the pillar calls both the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to preserve the 1968 status quo by asking the five nuclear powers (US, UK, France, China and the then USSR) to refrain from transferring, encouraging or supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states while asking the non-nuclear states, that is the rest of the world, not to develop or manufacture such weapons either alone or by the assistance of others. Since the treaty did not prohibit the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful use (as reflected in the third pillar of the treaty), the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at verifying that no nuclear power is diverted from peaceful use to the development of weapons. The second pillar, disarmament, can be seen as an attempt to do damage control. It contains language that vaguely obliges the signatories to move towards nuclear, as well as, total disarmament. Article VI states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament." However, it seems that the article places more emphasis on the responsibility of the signatories to engage in negotiations aiming at disarmament rather than disarmament itself. The last pillar, peaceful use of nuclear technology, allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to signatory states for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Has the NPT failed us? If the objective of the treaty was to limit the number of NWS to the five it recognized, bring about total nuclear disarmament and allow the peaceful use of nuclear technology, then, it has failed in two out of its three objectives. Technically, the states that ended up developing nuclear capabilities were not part to the treaty and thus, according to international law, not bound by it. The same holds true for North Korea. Although North Korea had signed the treaty it should be remembered that it withdrew in 2003 and did not become a nuclear weapons state until 2006. However, depending on one’s interpretation of the treaty, one can identify other violations that undermined the NPT’s success. A good example is the implementation of NATO’s nuclear weapons sharing program. The program allowed the deployment and storage of US nuclear weapons by NATO non-nuclear members. Although the nuclear weapons shared through the program and stationed on the soil of member states remained the possession of the US, the personnel training necessary for the safe handling of the weapons and the adaptations made by non-US forces (both naval and air) to enable use/delivery of the weapons could assume transfer of nuclear technical information thus violating Article I of the treaty. At the same time, by virtue of permitting the stationing of such weapons on their soil, the non-nuclear recipients are violating Article II of the treaty. Furthermore, a strict interpretation of the treaty would find all five nuclear weapon states in violation of it since they did not manage to achieve nuclear disarmament. However, one could argue, that although total conventional and nuclear disarmament is far from being a reality, since states have made efforts to reduce their arsenals within international arms control agreements the letter of the treaty was upheld. As for nuclear disarmament, despite the absence of a comprehensive treaty binding on all nuclear powers party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it could be argues that the treaty was instrumental in permitting negotiations between the US and the USSR at the height of the cold war. Last but not least, the ability of the signatories of the treaty to share nuclear technologies for civilian projects became the Achilles heal of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although only a handful of states diverted nuclear power from peaceful projects to the production of weapons, the proliferation of nuclear power for peaceful use permitted the proliferation of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In effect, such capabilities are tantamount to a virtual nuclear weapons program for they allow the on demand production of fissile materials necessary for nuclear weapons.
Based on the above we cannot regard the NTP as a complete failure. If anything it seems that the NPT as any other treaty has its limitations. Whether intentional or not it did create a divide between those that possessed nuclear weapons, those that did not and those that did not but would like to. The states that did not sign the NPT claim to have done so because of this divide and the question it raises: on what grounds is such a divide valid? Even worse, the NTP was not empowered with a credible enforcement regime that would address treaty violations and take action without holding non-proliferation hostage to the political interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The International Atomic Energy Agency responsible for monitoring compliance to the NPT reports violations that threaten international security to the UN Security Council for action.
With technological advances an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states should be expected. If nothing else, it should be taken for granted that a significant number of states using nuclear power have the technical knowledge to develop nuclear weapons but choose not to do so. According to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the number of states capable of developing nuclear weapons rests between 35 and 40.
The bipolar world that served as the backdrop to the formulation of the NPT of 1968 has seized to exist. A revised NPT needs to assume a multipolar world for many of the new NWS are, or aspire to become, regional powers. The new treaty should retain the three-pillar structure of its 1968 predecessor however, with a major change. The first pillar should become that of nuclear proliferation. First and foremost, the new regime needs to establish the conditions that will entice the current non-signatories to the NPT to join. By eliminating the divide between those that have nuclear weapons and those that have not, the new treaty will eliminate the argument presented by those nuclear weapons states that refuse to become party to it. This should be followed by a reversal of policy: rather that focus on no-proliferation a policy that will reinstate the divide but with a larger membership on the side of those states that possess the weapons than in the original treaty of 1968, the new treaty should allow proliferation. The clock cannot be set back to 1968. The new reality needs to be recognized and forward thinking mechanisms need to be put in place to govern the proliferation of nuclear power. The hope that the current non-signatories to the NPT will be willing to destroy their respective arsenals is ludicrous. This hope can only become reality if the major five abandon their arsenals as well. That, undoubtedly, is utopian. If the major nuclear states are unwilling to destroy their nuclear arsenals we should not expect the smaller ones to be willing to do so. If states are not willing to destroy their arsenals we should not expect others not to be interested in developing them especially if they perceive possession of them as a security guarantee against regional conflict. The tactics of sanctions (as has been the case with Iran, North Korea and even Libya) or preemptive military action against a sovereign state’s nuclear facilities (as Israel did against Iraq and the US against Libya) are neither effective nor acceptable. Once all nuclear weapon states are party to the new regime it will be imperative to launch comprehensive nuclear disarmament talks. If we are to reach a point where a non-nuclear world is to become a reality, bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament limited to the US and Russia is not enough. It is important to make sure that all NWS have a vested interest and are part of the process. The disparity of capabilities will pause a challenge but since any disarmament agreement will most likely be gradual allowances can be made to balance the process. A new element needs to be considered. With the new treaty allowing proliferation it is important that a system be put in place that safeguards the disarmament process. Here a lesson from the European Union might be appropriate. The disarmament regime negotiated by the NWS should be treated as Acquis Communautaire – it applied to all states part of the treaty irrespective of their status at the time of its adoption. Thus, should a non-nuclear state at the time of ratification decide to develop nuclear weapons, that state will be bound by any disarmament agreements in force. The last piece of the puzzle, the third pillar of the 1968 NPT should remain in place as is. The International Atomic Energy Agency should remain the main international body governing the proliferation of nuclear power for civilian projects. With policing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons no longer on its agenda, the Agency will have the opportunity to play a stronger role in introducing nuclear energy as an alternative fuel source and enhancing the secure operation of the nuclear reactors currently in service.
History shows us that the vigorous defense of the status quo by any group of states usually ends in conflict for it is inevitable that the group feeling left out will make it their priority to overturn the status quo as soon as they become strong enough to do so. Nuclear proliferation cannot be placed neatly into a box. Although changing the regime governing it though conflict is not an option, assured mutual distraction is certainly not an appealing option, the present status quo is destabilizing world security. The time has come to change that.
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